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Yataglass: Network-level Code 
Emulation for Analyzing 
Memory-scanning Attacks
Remote code injection attack
▌ Allows attackers to execute their arbitrary shellcode
►Various vulnerabilities can be exploited
◘ Stack overflow, Heap overwrite, Format string attack etc…
▌ Security researchers analyze shellcode to develop 
countermeasures
►Static disassembly is widely used
▌ Attackers can thwart static disassembly
►Encryption
◘ encrypts shellcode body
►Obfuscation
◘ inserts junk bytes between instructions
Network-level code emulator
▌ Emulate the execution of shellcode
►e.g.) Spector [Borders, et al. ‟07]
◘ extracts system functions issued by shellcode
▌ Advantage
►Never thwarted by encryption and obfuscation
◘ Encrypted shellcode is decrypted during execution









Typical application of 
network-level code emulator
▌ Analyze shellcode collected by honeypots
►Honeypot is a decoy host that collects malicious 
network traffic
◘ Allows us to collect a lot of shellcode for various servers
►Many anti-virus vendors, security research institutes 
have their honeypots
▌ Network-level code emulators extract executed 
instructions and system calls of collected shellcode
►The result is used for…
◘ Behavior-based virus detection of anti-virus software
◘ Restoring compromised servers from damage
Memory-scanning attack
▌ Memory-scanning attack can evade network-level 
code emulators
►Uses instructions in the victim process, that are outside 
shellcode, as a part of shellcode
▌ Current network-level code emulators cannot analyze 
shellcode of this style







Scans the victim‟s memory for a RET instruction
Stack region Code region
Why not use the victim‟s 
memory image?
▌ Using the victim‟s memory image is cumbersome
►In particular, when that honeypots collect shellcode…
◘ The analyst must prepare memory images of possible targeted 
software and their various versions
◘ No real victim process exists if the honeypot is low-interaction 
honeypot
▌ It is better to analyze shellcode without victim 
process‟s memory
►Enables us to analyze the shellcode collected by 
honeypots with less burden
►No need to  prepare many memory image
Proposal：Yataglass
▌ A network-level code emulator that allows us to 
analyze memory-scanning attack
►Infers instructions outside shellcode that a memory-
scanning shellcode scans for
▌ Victim‟s memory image is not required
►Enables us to analyze memory-scanning attack 
effectively




Shellcode scans the victim‟s  memory for the 
instructions outside the shellcode
Yataglass infers the scanned 
instructions from the shellcode’s 
scanning  instructions
Scanning loop
▌ A scanning loop scans the victim‟s memory for 
instructions
►Example： scans for a RET instruction (0xC3)
1: mov  edi, ADDR (An addr. of the victim proc.)
2:  LOOP:  inc  edi
3: cmpb [edi], 0xC3
4: jne  LOOP
5:  call  edi # Uses the found RET
6:  CONTINUE:  # Shellcode continues
Scanning loop
for „RET‟
▌ Yataglass infers what instructions are scanned for
►Infers the instructions from the exit-condition of the 
scanning loop
►In this example, EDI register points to a RET instruction when 
the control exits from the scanning loop
Symbolic execution
▌ To infer the scanned-for instructions, Yataglass uses 
symbolic execution
▌ Symbolic execution executes a program without 
concrete values
►Values are regarded as symbols
►Operations are done symbolically
►A result of an operation is expressed as a new symbol 








eax = (X + Y)
A symbol for unknown INPUT1
A symbol for unknown INPUT2
Inferring scanned-for instructions 
by symbolic execution
▌ Yataglass forks if an unknown symbol is used as a predicate of 
conditional branch
► Executes both branch with appropriate constraints
► The instance of Yataglass which exits from the loop has 
appropriate conditions to exit from the scanning loop
► Yataglass terminates execution if the same loop is executed to 
prevent path explosion
Instruction sequence
1: mov edi, X
2:   LOOP: inc edi
3: cmpb [edi], 0xC3
4: jne  LOOP
5: call edi
Symbolic execution
edi = X (An addr. of the victim proc.)
edi = (X + 1)
Compared *(X+1) with 0xC3
Set constraint [edi] == 0xC3
Jump to [edi] == RET
More complicated scanning
▌ Using multiple constraints to find an instruction
Instruction sequence
1: mov edi, X
2:    LOOP: inc edi
3: cmpb [edi], 0xC2
4: jle  LOOP




edi = X (An addr.of the victim proc.)
edi = X + 1
Compared *(X+1) with 0xC2
Set constraint [edi]>0xC2
Compared *(X+1) with 0xC4
Set constraint [edi]<0xC4
([edi]>0xC2) && ([edi]<0xC4)
->  [edi] == 0xC3 („RET‟)
Experiment: Analysis of 
memory-scanning attacks
▌ Obtained seven realworld shellcode from SecurityFocus and
Milw0rm
▌ Inserted memory-scanning code to the shellcode
▌ Compared execution result with Spector [Borders, et al., „07]
► Spector is one of the state-of-the art network-level code emulator






















Analysis result of real shellcode
▌ Analyzed shellcode for B/O vuln. in samba 2.2.7 
that incorporates memory-scanning code
▌ Yataglass extracted a list of system calls issued by 


















Analysis result of real shellcode 
(cont.d)
▌ We manually analyzed the shellcode by 
injecting it into the target server and tracing 
instructions with GDB
►accepts a network connection from the attacker 
by socket(), listen() and accept()
►redirects the stdin/out to the connection by 
dup2()
►executes /bin/sh  by execve()
▌ Confirmed the result generated by Yataglass
Limitations
▌ Yataglass cannot  infer instructions if the shellcode scans 
for a value in a range
►pop instructions ranges from 0x58 to 0x5F regarding registers
◘ pop eax=0x58,  pop ebx=0x59, …  pop edi = 0x5F
►Shellcode may use a scanning loop that accepts all pop 
instructions followed by ret instruction
◘ e.g.) save all registers, push garbage value, call the scanned pop and 
ret, and then restore registers
►Solution: fork() with assuming one of the possible values
▌ Yataglass cannot infer instructions when shellcode scans 
for a function signature
►Shellcode may scan for the first several bytes of fopen() to 
invoke it
►We think signature-based inference is useful
Related work
▌ Spector [Borders, et al. ‟07]
► Uses symbolic execution to extract behaviors of shellcode
► Can be evaded by memory-scanning attacks
▌ Detection of decryption behavior in polymorphic shellcode 
using emulation [Polychronakis, et al. ‟06]
► Counts payload reads followed by GetPC code
► Can be evaded by memory-scanning attacks
◘ But we can easily apply Yataglass‟s technique to this emulator
▌ Polymorphic worm detection based on static analysis [Kruegel, 
et al. ‟05]
► Extracts possible control flows inside payloads and finds a match 
between extracted control flows in multiple streams
► Yataglass extracts detailed behavior of shellcode used by worms
Summary
▌ Memory-scanning attack
►Uses instructions of the victim process as a part of shellcode
►Evades current network-level code emulators
▌ Proposed Yataglass to analyze memory-scanning attacks
►Infers the scanned-for instructions with symbolic execution
►Successfully analyzed memory-scanning shellcode without 
victim process‟s memory image
▌ Future work
►Automatic defense against shellcode
►Automatic recovery from the damage of shellcode
